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 This is a comprehensive study of how the administrative powers of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) have evolved in response to external political forces. To analyze the 
changes made to FBI administrative powers, this project will assess theories of public 
administration, bureaucratic politics, various congressional statutes, court rulings, and executive 
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Bureaucratic Politics and the Federal Bureau of Investigation ____________________________ 
Because they are chiefly organizations of people, government agencies have unique and 
individual personalities akin to human personalities--complete with self-interests, flaws, likes, 
and dislikes--that determine the way in which they operate. In certain cases, an agency’s 
personality may also be defined by the general culture of its general workforce, not its 
administrative leadership. In his 1980 book Street Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the 
Individual in Public Services, political scientist Michael Lipsky posits that it is the discretion of 
frontline civil servants who operate on the field and interact directly with the public that define 
an agency’s interpretation of the law. Lipsky assesses how field agents of local government, such 
as teachers and policemen, are most directly in control of how an agency operates, which 
informs our understanding of direct enforcement by governmental entities (Lipsky 1980). 
However, in the case of high-level federal bureaucracy, the overarching disposition and direction 
of an agency generally parallels the personality of that agency’s leadership. The high-level actors 
become symbolic of the agencies they represent and governmental action and policymaking is 
often a result of the bargaining by these actors.  
The subfield of bureaucratic politics aims to understand how the government operates by 
considering how these actors characterize and affect the operations of agencies. Bureaucratic 
politics is defined as a theoretical and actor-oriented approach to public policy that emphasizes 
internal political bargaining within the state by a variety of intergovernmental actors (Hegele 
2018, 753-754). The bureaucratic politics model was first described by political scientist Graham 
T. Allison in his article “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” in which Allison 
contrasts the bureaucratic politics model of policymaking with the “rational policy” model--
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which suggests that the state acts as a unitary actor in effectuating the most rational approach to 
policy problems-- and the “organizational process” model--which suggests that all policymaking 
derives from a uniform set of established bureaucratic procedures (Allison 1969, 691-694; 698-
700). Allison argues that policymaking is a multilateral process that involves a variety of 
“players positioned hierarchically within the government” (Allison 1969, 707). These actors are 
driven by a variety of factors affecting their decision-making. These factors may include the 
interests of an elected officials constituents, the trade agreements of the military-industrial 
complex, and distinctive missions and leadership styles of various officials. Due to the diverse 
nature of government agencies, various bureaucracies often have competing interests with each 
other.  
Among the most significant case studies of bureaucratic politics is the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation. Since its creation in the early 20th Century, the FBI has found itself directly 
involved in the most significant national policy arenas of the United States government. As an 
agency, the bureau has operated with a distinctive culture and personality that has evolved in 
response to its directorship, world affairs, political movements, and other external factors. For 
the majority of its history, the FBI’s personality was dictated by its longest-serving and most 
influential director, J. Edgar Hoover. Director Hoover, who served as the head of the FBI for 
almost fifty years, played a monumental role in expanding the bureau from a negligible agency 
of only thirty-four agents to a looming bureaucratic giant--nearly one-thousand times bigger than 
its inaugural size. Primarily through Hoover, the FBI came to symbolize government 
surveillance, security, and enforcement. However, despite the incredible influence of the FBI 




The objective of this project is to describe the bureaucratic politics of the FBI since its 
inception in 1908 and assess how intergovernmental bargaining and external forces shaped the 
agency’s development and behavior over time. Understanding the effects of bureaucratic politics 
on the FBI informs our understanding of the bureau’s complex and dynamic relationships with 
other government agencies, expanded administrative powers, controversial operations, and 
overall role in global affairs. Because external forces influence the agendas of bargaining actors 
in bureaucratic politics, it is hypothesized that changes in the FBI’s external environment 
influence changes to the FBI’s operation in that the bureau is entrusted with greater 
administrative discretion when the United States’ external environment becomes more uncertain. 
External uncertainty, in national and international context, likely results in the growth of FBI 
power, especially power that is relatively independent of legislative or judicial checks and 
balances.  
 
A Brief Summary of FBI History __________________________________________________ 
When the Bureau of Investigation (BOI) was first established by Attorney General 
Charles Bonaparte on July 26th, 1908, the diminutive agency employed a total of thirty-four 
agents. The scope of BOI jurisdiction was limited to investigating violations of antitrust laws and 
interstate commerce laws. The small government agency gradually began to amass more power 
as various crimes, like human trafficking via the Mann Act (1910) and the interstate 
transportation of stolen vehicles via the Dyer Act (1919), became designated as federal offenses. 
When J. Edgar Hoover was appointed head of the agency in 1924 by President Calvin Coolidge, 
the BOI underwent a powerful, long-term metamorphosis. Finally, in 1935, the Bureau of 
Investigation was formally renamed the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  
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Throughout WWII and the Cold War, the FBI proved instrumental to wartime 
counterintelligence operations, including the bureau’s intimate involvement with the Venona 
Project, a program charged with intercepting Signal Intelligence transmissions from the Soviet 
Union. It surveilled communist spies and political radicals who engaged in alleged subversive 
activities that threatened domestic security. To fulfill the bureau’s mounting responsibilities, 
Director Hoover sponsored tremendous advancements within the FBI, such as the creation of the 
National Crime Lab. During his forty-eight year tenure as director, J. Edgar Hoover almost 
singlehandedly transformed a once negligible squad of detectives into the most powerful law 
enforcement agency in the world.  
Upon Hoover’s death in 1972, there was somewhat of a reversal of the FBI’s public 
image. Shortly after Hoover’s passing, “Deep Throat,” a whistleblower later revealed to be 
Associate FBI Director Mark Felt, exposed the FBI’s questionable role in the Watergate cover-
up. In 1975, the United States Senate formed the Church Committee, which investigated the 
furtive activities of the U.S. intelligence community. The committee uncovered several examples 
of abuses of power perpetrated by the FBI--including particularly disturbing activities committed 
during the Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO). The Church Hearings, coupled with 
growing mistrust toward government bureaucracies since Watergate, led to massive outcry 
against perceived abuses of power by the agencies of the U.S. intelligence community and drove 
several subsequent pieces of legislation designed to reign in these agencies’ relatively unchecked 
powers. The reputation of the FBI was continually challenged for the rest of the 20th Century 
since the Church Committee findings. The bureau became associated with the failures of the 
Ruby Ridge Incident (1992) and the Waco Siege (1993). Because of these incidents, the FBI was 
increasingly viewed as reckless and incapable of monitoring the activities of its own personnel.  
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Upon the tragedy of 9/11, many critics of the FBI reneged on their calls to ground the 
agency. The traumatized nation turned to the intelligence community to protect it from the newly 
apparent threat of foreign terrorism. Under Director Robert Mueller, the FBI became 
considerably more powerful, particularly with the passage of the PATRIOT Act. The bureau 
took on an increasingly internationalized role and its domestic surveillance was not only 
permitted but accepted by Congress and much of the public. Recently, the FBI’s activities in the 
2016 presidential election and the Trump Administration have led to yet another widespread 
reconsideration of the agency’s role in American life. While the public and legislative opinion of 
the agency remains sharply inconstant, the ebbs and flows of the FBI’s influence and authority 













Part I - J. Edgar Hoover 
In the Beginning: The Birth of the Bureau of Investigation (BOI)__________________________ 
Prior to the establishment of its own investigatory arm, the United States Department of 
Justice relied on borrowing agents from the U.S. Secret Service to fulfill its on-the-field needs. 
This practice of using Secret Service operatives ended in May of 1908 when Congress prohibited 
the lending of Secret Service employees to any outside federal agency or department. In response 
to this ban and the growing need for investigators, Attorney General Charles Bonaparte 
established the Bureau of Investigation (BOI), a team of thirty-four agents who would investigate 
federal offenses on behalf of the Justice Department, on July 26, 1908 (FBI, A Brief History).  
The two principal actors involved in the Bureau of Investigation’s foundation were the 
White House and the U.S. Department of Justice. The backdrop of the bureaucratic politics that 
formed the bureau was the shared interest in trust-busting, a movement that partly defined the 
Progressive Era of American Politics. Both President Theodore Roosevelt and his Attorney 
General Charles Bonaparte were staunch progressives with a shared agenda that involved 
combatting corrupt trusts and monopolies. Because of its founders’ trustbuster tradition, the BOI 
was initially focused on antitrust investigations. In addition to antitrust cases, the BOI also 
investigated violations of Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, though the scope of what constituted 
an interstate commerce violation was limited due to the relative infancy of American interstate 
commerce laws (FBI, A Brief History).  
The BOI began to accumulate further responsibilities as various state crimes became 
federal offenses. Principal statutes that affected the BOI’s investigative jurisdiction involved the 
definitional purview of interstate commerce laws, including: 
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• The Mann Act (1910) 18 U.S.C. § 2421 et seq: This law designated the transportation of 
“any individual, male or female, in interstate or foreign commerce or in any territory or 
possession of the United States for the purpose of prostitution or sexual activity” as a 
federal offense. Also known as the “White Slave Traffic Act”.  
• The Dyer Act (1919) 18 U.S.C. § 2311 et seq: This law made “the interstate 
transportation of stolen vehicles a federal crime”. The Dyer Act originally only specified 
automobile theft as a federal crime, though the theft of aircraft was formally added to the 
statute in 1945.  
 
 WWI and the Espionage Act_____________________________________________________ 
From the beginning of the 20th Century, concerns about political radicals pervaded 
American life--mainly worries toward socialists, anarchists, and communists. Socialism had 
already become widely associated with political violence due to several violent riots that 
occurred in labor union disputes, such as Chicago’s Haymarket massacre of 1886 which led to 
“widespread hysteria directed against immigrants and labor leaders” (Encyclopaedia Britannica 
2019). Similarly, anarchism had quickly become a threatening trend. President William 
McKinley had previously been assassinated by Polish-American anarchist Leon Czolgosz in 
1901, which catapulted the fringe movement to the forefront of public worry (Eschner 2017). In 
response to his predecessor’s death at the hands of an avowed anarchist, President Theodore 
Roosevelt stated, “When compared with the suppression of anarchy, every other question sinks 
into insignificance” (Rapoport 2006, 386). Furthermore, the Russian Revolution in 1917 
demonstrated to the American public as well as the rest of the world how dangerously 
efficacious communist groups could be in overthrowing national governments. The combined 
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influence of these fears played such a significant role in American life at this time that this era 
became known as the First Red Scare.  
The most aggressive elements of anarchist-socialist radicalism culminated in the 
Galleanist Bombings of 1919. Italian anarchist Luigi Galleani orchestrated a series of bombings 
that targeted politicians and government officials throughout the United States (Segre 1991). 
Among the targets of Galleani’s terroristic campaign was Attorney General Mitchell Palmer, 
whose house was nearly destroyed by a mail bomb delivered by Galleanist Carlo Valdinoci on 
June 2nd, 1919 (FBI n.d.). Palmer, understandably affected by the attempt on his life, led an 
impassioned campaign to crackdown on the subversive ideologues in the United States. In the 
bargaining process with the national legislature, the attorney general, echoing President 
Roosevelt’s dramatic claims against anarchists, told Congress that the anarchist revolutionaries 
could “on a certain day...rise up and destroy the government at one fell swoop” to justify his 
requests for increased funding for Justice Department operations (Michaels 2017, 50). To abet 
his anti-radical campaign, Mitchell Palmer assigned his assistant, twenty-four year old John 
Edgar Hoover, to head the Department of Justice’s General Intelligence Division (GID) on 
August 1st, 1919 (FBI, Palmer Raids).  
During the First Red Scare, the BOI was seen as a means to handle the growing concerns 
about domestic loyalties during WWI. To protect against “subversion and sabotage”, Congress 
passed both the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918. (FBI, A Brief History).  
• Espionage Act (1917) 18 USC Ch. 37 § 792 et seq (Originally Pub. L. 65–24, 40 Stat. 
217): Outlawed the production and conveyance of “false reports or false statements with 
intent to interfere” with national defense operations, the incitation of insubordination or 
9 
 
disloyalty in the U.S. armed forces, and the obstruction of recruitment and enlistment 
serves of the military.   
• Sedition Act (1918) Pub. L. 65–150, 40 Stat. 553: An extension to the Espionage Act that 
prohibited “disloyal, profane, scurrilous or abusive language” concerning the national 
government, the U.S. flag or military. Furthermore, the Sedition Act criminalized speech 
“that caused others to view the American government or its institutions with contempt”. 
The act was repealed in 1921.  
The constitutionality of the Espionage Act was challenged in the landmark Supreme Court 
case Schenk v. United States (1919).  The appellant, general secretary of the Philadelphia 
Socialist Party Charles Schenck, was charged with “conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of 
1917 by attempting to cause insubordination in the military and to obstruct recruitment” through 
the distribution of anti-draft leaflets. Schenck challenged the admissibility of the government’s 
evidence on First Amendment grounds. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes authored a unanimous 
opinion in favor of the United States, arguing that the national security interest superseded 
Schenk’s First Amendment rights and famously stating:  
“The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely 
shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. ... The question in every case is 
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as 
to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils 
that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.” 
(Holmes 1919) .  
With congressional authorization and additional affirmation by the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Schenk v. United States, the Department of Justice was given authority over counterintelligence 
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investigations, enforcement, and prosecution as clarified by the Espionage and Sedition Acts and 
the BOI became the primary investigatory agency for such cases. The General Intelligence 
Division (GID) of the Department of Justice--which would later be established as a division 
within the BOI in 1921--was responsible for facilitating BOI investigations into suspected 
traitors and for the identification of people associated with radical political groups. The BOI 
worked closely with J. Edgar Hoover to provide his division with information and evidence that 
implicated individuals likely to be involved in the violent activities of radical organizations (FBI, 
Palmer Raids). Using the authority endowed by the Espionage and Sedition Acts, the GID 
arrested various prominent figures in radical subculture. Among those arrested were anarchist 
writers Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman, who were charged with conspiring against 
WWI conscription, a violation of the Espionage Act (New York Times 1917).  
Additionally, the congressional statutory authorization in the aforementioned acts gave actors 
Attorney General Mitchell Palmer and GID Head J. Edgar Hoover the administrative power to 
launch the Palmer Raids, a series of law enforcement raids lasting from November 1919 to 
January 1920 in which radical leftists were apprehended and charged with violations of the 
Espionage Act. The publicized enforcement of the Espionage Act led the Bureau of Investigation 
to become known as the face of wartime domestic security in the United States. The joint nature 
of the anti-radical programs orchestrated and executed by the General Intelligence Division and 
the Bureau of Investigation led to an absorption of the GID by the BOI in 1921 as well as the 
appointment of J. Edgar Hoover as assistant director of the BOI in the same year (FBI, n.d.).  
By 1924, the Palmer Raids of the First Red Scare had enabled the Bureau of Investigation to 
“retain wartime levels of staffing” and the agency employed a total of 697 personnel, a 556 
staffing increase since the outbreak of WWI in 1914 (Belknap 1982, 27). The BOI was, at this 
11 
 
point, the largest bureau in the Department of Justice (Belknap 1982, 26). In spite of this, the 
Palmer Raids were characterized by miscommunications, ineffective planning, inaccurate 
intelligence about the targets of arrest warrants, and a long list of constitutional violations (FBI 
n.d.). As a result, public opinion turned against the Department of Justice. Following the 
calamitous Palmer Raids, the Department of Justice underwent a period of continuing scandals 
that further aggravated its image crisis. Attorney General Mitchell Palmer’s successor, Harry M. 
Daugherty, was responsible for escalating labor tensions. Attorney General Daugherty, an 
unscrupulous political operative who had previously served as President Warren G. Harding’s 
campaign manager, falsely alleged that the Great Railroad Strike of 1922 was organized by 
communists and directed a series of injunctions against the union leaders involved. Similar to the 
Palmer Raids, Daugherty’s campaign against the railroad strikers proved to be widely unpopular 
and further damaged the reputation of the Department of Justice. Moreover, Daugherty was 
accused of corruption stemming from his connection with the “Ohio Gang” of Ohio-based 
politicians who had been appointed to prominent executive positions via cronyism. After 
Harding’s death, President Calvin Coolidge compelled Harry Daugherty’s resignation 
(University of Michigan, n.d.; Grossman 2017).  
President Coolidge, eager to repair the damaged reputation of the Department of Justice, 
appointed Harlan Fiske Stone to replace Daugherty as attorney general. Attorney General Stone 
was a reformist and advocate-statesmen who quickly fired Harding’s cronies from the DOJ and 
curbed the domestic surveillance and persecution of American political figures by the Bureau of 
Investigation. Attorney General Stone dismantled the BOI’s first domestic intelligence program, 
prohibited the usage of wiretaps, and barred the BOI from political spying, limiting the bureau’s 
role “strictly to investigations of violations of the law” (Elliff 2016, 16; Katyal 2008, 1035). He 
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was quoted in the American Civil Liberties Union’s 1924 pamphlet “The Nationwide Spy 
System Centering in the Department of Justice,” stating: 
“There is always the possibility that a secret police system may become a menace 
to free government and free institutions because it carries with it the possibility of 
abuses of power which are not always quickly apprehended or understood. The 
enormous expansion of federal legislation... has made a federal bureau of 
investigation a necessary instrument of law enforcement. But it is important that 
its activities be strictly limited to those functions for which it was created and that 
its agents themselves be not above the law or be- yond its reach” (Belknap 1985, 
201).  
Despite his efforts to otherwise reign in the Department of Justice, Stone is partly 
remembered as the attorney general who formally appointed J. Edgar Hoover to serve as director 
of the Bureau of Investigation in May of 1924.  
 
The Early Hoover Years: Profiling the FBI and Its Directorship From 1924-1935_____________ 
As aforementioned, an agency is often characterized by its leadership and directing actors 
may become emblematic of the agency as a whole. Because of this, to understand an agency’s 
disposition, it is important to understand various models of bureaucratic leadership. In his 1964 
study Inside Bureaucracy, Anthony Downs highlights five different archetypes of bureaucratic 
personalities exhibited by agency officials. According to Downs’ bureaucratic models theory, 
there are purely self-interested officials who are “motivated entirely by goals which benefit 
themselves rather than their bureaus or society at large” (Downs 1964, 4). These officials include 
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climbers who “seek to maximize their own power, income, and prestige” through promotion and 
aggrandizement and conservers who “seek to maximize their own security and convenience” 
maintaining the status quo and opposing change (Downs 1964, 4). Conversely, there are also 
mixed-motive officials who “have goals that combine self-interest and altruistic loyalty to larger 
values” (Downs 1964, 5). These officials include three profiles: zealots “who are loyal to 
relatively narrow policies or concepts” and seek power to “effectuate the sacred policies to which 
they are loyal,” advocates who are “loyal to a broader set of policies or to a broader 
organization” and are “highly partisan in supporting [their] organization in conflicts with 
outsiders,” and statesmen who are “loyal to the nation or society as a whole” (Downs 1964, 5).  
J. Edgar Hoover was simultaneously a climber and an advocate. As a climber, Hoover 
was a Machiavellian bureaucrat whose shrewd maneuvering and navigation of complex 
bureaucracy remains unparalleled. His rise to prominence was unfathomably precocious. From 
Director Hoover to Director Christopher Wray, the average age of FBI directors upon their 
appointment was 51 years. When J. Edgar Hoover was first appointed director of the bureau, he 
was 29 years-old. Like many who rise to power in a short span of time, J. Edgar Hoover’s timing 
was impeccable. Despite his association with the failed Palmer Raids, Hoover entered 
government service at a time when the United States was still gripped with fear and desperate for 
effective protection against the rising threats of political radicalism. Hoover’s personality seemed 
superbly fitting for a federal bureaucrat during this time, not only due to his ambition and 
cunning, but also because he essentially embodied the First Red Scare. Throughout Hoover’s 
life, crises provided a necessary backdrop to his professional climb as, “in quieter times, [his] 
aggressive brand of leadership may [have been] less necessary and less acceptable” (Baumer 
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2014, 102). Furthermore, Hoover frequently exercised his administrative powers to effectuate his 
own personal interests and, most notoriously, his personal vendettas.  
However, in addition to his egocentric exploitations of the FBI, Hoover was undoubtably 
a stalwart advocate of the bureau. As characteristic of Downs’ advocate archetype, J. Edgar 
Hoover was extremely partisan in representing FBI interests against competing interests and 
elevating his agency’s power above all outside organizations--resulting in a closed-system of 
intelligence. Perhaps more so than any other civil servant, Hoover came to embody the agency 
he directed and "the indoctrination and socialization of FBI people were so thorough and so 
uniform that the Bureau had, to a large extent, become the mirror reflection of J. Edgar Hoover” 
(Lewis 1984, 140). Because of his aggressive advocacy of his organization in policymaking, 
Hoover is a prime example of bargaining actors in the processes described by bureaucratic 
politics.  
For much of its early history, the bargaining group responsible for FBI policies and 
practices was relatively small. The key actors involved in the FBI were (1) the president, (2) the 
attorney general, and (3) Director J. Edgar Hoover. Of these actors, J. Edgar Hoover was the 
most consistent player and his tenure outlasted all other bargaining actors, including eight 
presidents. This gave Hoover a strong advantage as he was embedded in the executive branch 
and had an acute understanding of its operations and secrets. Hoover’s proficiency with 
bureaucratic politics enabled him to exert his will over surveillance policy over the course of his 
directorship, particularly as it pertained to wiretapping.  
While the attorney general’s regulation against wiretapping practices was not violated by 
the any component of the Department of Justice, the Department of Treasury’s Bureau of 
Prohibition continued using wiretap evidence in its investigations of criminal bootleggers. One 
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such bootlegger, a corrupt Seattle policeman named Roy Olmstead, was indicted for conspiracy 
to violate the Volstead Act based on an investigation that relied on evidence gathered from 
wiretapped household phones. Olmstead challenged the admissibility of the evidence on Fourth 
and Fifth Amendment grounds and the case was eventually heard by the United States Supreme 
Court. In Olmstead v. United States (1928), the Court ruled in favor of the respondent prohibition 
agents, holding that the Fourth Amendment was inapplicable to wiretapping evidence because 
wiretapping technology could not have been considered when the Amendment was first 
authored. The Court did however affirm the power of Congress to restrict wiretap evidence 
through subsequent legislation (Katyal 2008, 1035). Even though the legality and admissibility 
of wiretapping was affirmed, BOI Director J. Edgar Hoover publicly denied the use of such 
investigatory methods in 1929. The Bureau of Prohibition was transferred from the Department 
of Treasury to the Department of Justice in 1930, renewing considerations of wiretapping 
evidence in both the Justice Department and Congress (Murchison 2003). In 1934, Congress 
used its legislative authority clarified in Olmstead and passed the Communications Act of 1934, 
which broadly regulated telephonic wiretapping practices.  
• Communications Act (1934) 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq: This law regulates interstate and 
foreign communication by wire or radio, and for other purposes. Section 705 ([47 U.S.C. 
605) addresses the interception of such communication, stating that “no person not being 
authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the 
existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted 
communications to any person” (FCC 1934, 319).  
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The Department of Justice interpreted that the legislation “did not preclude wiretapping per se, 
only wiretapping plus disclosure” and thus resumed wiretapping activities in criminal 
investigations (Katyal 2008, 1038).  
At this time, the Bureau of Investigation had emerged as a premier crimefighting agency. In 
1932, Director J. Edgar Hoover helped pioneer the use of fingerprint identification in criminal 
investigations and established the “Criminological Laboratory,” a facility for the bureau’s 
scientific analysis of forensic evidence (Press 1932 and FAS n.d.). Within the first year of the 
lab’s existence, the “National Fraudulent Check File and Single Fingerprint Section” were added 
to the laboratory’s repertoire and, in 1934, the Criminological Laboratory was moved to the 
Department of Justice building. In an amazingly short span of time, the Criminological 
Laboratory--renamed the FBI Laboratory in 1943--had revolutionized the nascent field of 
forensic science and had equipped the bureau with state-of-the-art investigative capabilities (FAS 
n.d.). In 1935, the Bureau of Investigation was formally renamed the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, or the FBI.  
In addition to its internal advancements, the bureau received more public recognition than 
ever before. Previously, Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone had urged Director Hoover to 
follow the model of law enforcement established by Scotland Yard and avoid “wide publicity” 
(Elliff 2016, 16). J. Edgar Hoover decided to ignore this direction entirely and, throughout the 
1920s and 1930s, Hoover launched a flamboyant “War on Crime” in which he aggressively 
pursued the most celebrated crimes in American media. Hoover’s dogged efforts to commandeer 
investigations of headliner cases led to further statutory changes to the federal criminal code. In 
March of 1932, the infant son of celebrity aviator Charles Lindbergh was abducted from his 
nursery. Charles Lindbergh Jr.’s disappearance was accompanied by a ransom note that 
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demanded payment of $50,000. Hoover supported the ongoing investigation of the kidnapping 
by the New Jersey State Police and inserted the bureau as an active member in the case (FBI, 
Lindbergh Kidnapping). The case incited public sentiments and there was a widespread call for 
Congress to step in (Bomar 1934, 436). The outcry led to Congress passing the Federal 
Kidnapping Act, which gave Hoover’s agency chief jurisdiction over the Lindbergh 
investigation.  
• Federal Kidnapping Act (1932) 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1): This law extended federal 
jurisdiction over interstate kidnaping. Under this bill, the maximum penalty for federal 
kidnapping charges was life imprisonment. The Federal Kidnapping Act is also known as 
the “Little Lindbergh Law” (Bomar 1934, 437).  
Meanwhile, as the Bureau of Investigation garnered mass idolatry for its well-publicized 
achievements, the once-fringe Nazi Party had finally come to power in Germany. Paul von 
Hindenburg had appointed Adolf Hitler chancellor of Germany in 1933 and Hitler would seize 
total control of the nation as Fϋhrer the following year. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was 
profoundly wary of the threat posed by the Nazis. Two months after the passage of the 
Communications Act, President Roosevelt directed J. Edgar Hoover to resume domestic 
intelligence operations to probe the Nazi movement in the United States. Hoover instructed all 
FBI field offices to conduct an intensive "intelligence investigation" into far right-wing agitators. 
In the probe of domestic fascists, Hoover investigated several critics of the New Deal, including 
the Nazi-sympathizing radio-preacher Father Charles Coughlin and General Smedley Butler, 
who was associated with the “Business Plot”--an alleged 1933 conspiracy to usurp the American 
government and install a fascist regime. The past efforts of the bureau to surveil left-wing 
radicals underwent a notable reversal of focus to concentrate on right-wing radicals. The Bureau 
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of Investigation had fully resumed its surveillance of political figures by 1935, veritably 
contradicting the reforms of Harlan Fiske Stone (O’Reilly 1982, 646).  
President Roosevelt’s interest in censoring critics of his administration became allied 
with Hoover’s interest in censoring critics of his agency. Within the context of WWII, it was not 
uncommon for federal agencies to influence media portrayals of government. During the war, 
both the Department of War and the Department of Treasury joined forces with radio networks 
in a joint effort to advertise war bonds in entertainment programming. The FBI entered the 
wartime propaganda system by authorizing depictions of itself that portrayed the bureau as an 
upstanding law enforcement organization. The bureau directly influenced its depiction in books, 
movies, news articles, and, perhaps most prominently, radio dramas. In “authorized retellings” of 
FBI activities, “any inkling of an out-of-control or overly powerful FBI was scrubbed from the 
historical record, replaced with themes of science, responsibility, and Hoover’s cautious and 
protective leadership” (Cecil 2015, 253). Ironically, the key value Hoover sought to portray was 
the bureau’s quiet restraint, as this “restrained image…was a key element in the physical and 
jurisdictional growth of the bureau” (Cecil 2015, 253).  
 
Executive Unilateralism: FDR, the FBI, WWII, and the VENONA Project__________________ 
Though the FBI had established itself as a domestic crimefighting agency during the 
glamourous “War on Crime” that lasted from 1924 well into the 1930s, J. Edgar Hoover was 
increasingly interested in non-criminal intelligence operations, particularly amid growing 
international tensions related to the rise of authoritarian regimes abroad. However, the FBI had 
no legal authority to involve itself in operations beyond the realm of domestic criminal 
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investigations. Furthermore, despite his support for executive branch power and empowered 
national security, President Roosevelt feared that a “formal request for non-criminal intelligence 
investigations would leak and generate public controversy”. To avoid giving the FBI too much 
power, President Roosevelt only allowed Hoover to partake in operations jointly approved by 
Attorney General Homer Cummings and Secretary of State Cordell Hull (Katyal 2008, 1038). J. 
Edgar Hoover, a relatively subservient actor in this established bargaining group, decided to 
ignore the president and bypass cabinet approval, and he unilaterally directed the FBI to begin 
developing a surveillance program for the collection of non-criminal intelligence (Katyal 2008, 
1039). Notably, Hoover’s dismissal of the president’s orders was a flagrant and unprecedented 
subversion of Graham Allison’s organizational process model of bureaucracy, as he opted to 
ignore administrative rules and procedures from the highest end of governmental hierarchy in 
order to effectuate his desired policy. Hoover’s method of bypassing the established bargaining 
process would become a recurring element of his leadership and major cause for his ability to 
expedite policy in spite of interagency checks and balances associated with bureaucratic politics.  
Because of the permissive interpretation of the 1934 Communications Act as a 
prohibition of wiretapping disclosures rather than wiretapping practices, federal law enforcement 
resumed wiretap operations throughout the late 1930s. The legality of this practice was 
challenged in 1939 in Nardone v. United States, in which the Supreme Court clarified that 
wiretapping was forbidden at any stage of a criminal investigation, as any information used to 
direct the overarching investigation was considered “fruit of the poisonous tree” that tainted the 
admissibility of all resultant evidence. With the Nardone ruling, antagonism towards wiretapping 
had finally come full circle-- having “been expressed by Congress, affirmed by the Court, and 
applauded by the media” (Katyal 2008, 1047). Moreover, Attorney General Robert H. Jackson 
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further acknowledged the Nardone decision by signaling the end of wiretapping practices in an 
official Department of Justice press release. Boldly, J. Edgar Hoover made the Justice 
Department’s codified ban on wiretapping appear as his idea to the public, in spite of his extreme 
behind-the-curtains advocacy for enhanced surveillance measures (Katyal 2008, 1048). The 
media propagated this subterfuge and, on Mar. 18, 1940, a New York Times headline even 
reported, “Justice Department Bans Wire Tapping: Jackson Acts on Hoover Recommendation” 
(Katyal 2008, 1048). As he publicly assumed credit for supporting Nardone, J. Edgar Hoover 
quietly worked to reallow wiretapping operations. He duplicitously “began leaking stories to the 
press of how Jackson’s policies hindered FBI investigations,” sowing the seeds for an eventual 
reconsideration of wiretapping laws (Katyal 2008, 1049-1050).  
J. Edgar Hoover was far from the only official at personal odds with the Nardone ruling. 
World War II had broken out just three months prior to Nardone and the globe had erupted in 
chaos and hostility. President Roosevelt was insecure about the United States’ capacity for 
counterintelligence during the war and was particularly concerned by “German and Soviet 
involvement in the organization of propaganda or so-called 'fifth columns' ... and in the 
preparation for sabotage, as well as in actual sabotage in Spain, France, and the western 
hemisphere.” Though the U.S. had not yet formally entered WWII, Roosevelt believed that 
wiretapping was necessary to effectively combat the promulgation of foreign agendas in the 
United States by the fifth column propaganda machines. Finally, on May 21, 1940, Roosevelt 
relayed a confidential memorandum that granted secret authorization of FBI wiretapping 
(Theoharis 1992, 104). His memorandum to Attorney General Jackson read as follows:  
“I have agreed with the broad purpose of the Supreme Court decision relating to 
wiretapping in investigations. The Court is undoubtedly sound both in regard to the use 
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of evidence secured over tapped wires in the prosecution of citizens in criminal cases; 
and it is also right in its opinion that under ordinary and normal circumstances 
wiretapping by Government agents should not be carried on for the excellent reason that 
it is almost bound to lead to abuse of civil rights. However, I am convinced that the 
Supreme Court never intended any dictum in the particular case which it decided to apply 
to grave matters involving the defense of the nation… You are, therefore, authorized and 
directed in such cases as you may approve, after investigation of the need in each case, to 
authorize the necessary investigating agents that they are at liberty to secure information 
by listening devices directed to the conversation or other communications of persons 
suspected of subversive activities against the Government of the United States, including 
suspected spies. You are requested furthermore to limit these investigations so conducted 
to a minimum and to limit them insofar as possible to aliens.” (Roosevelt, 1940).  
Attorney General Jackson sought to distance himself from the authorization, declining to 
keep detailed records “concerning the cases in which wire-tapping would be utilized” and 
yielding considerable bureaucratic discretion to Director Hoover, who in turn kept exclusive 
record of wiretapping operations for himself (Theoharis 1992, 105). The FBI was thus authorized 
to conduct intelligence gathering operations at the direct behest of the White House without 
having to undergo the checks and balance of external approvals. The collaboration of Roosevelt 
and Hoover led to the establishment of a closed-system of intelligence gathering by the executive 
branch, independent from legislative or judicial scrutiny. Though these surveillance activities 
were meant to be used exclusively in matters of national defense, the president “retained the 
discretion to define what constituted a national defense case.” Accordingly, Franklin Roosevelt, 
and later Harry Truman, both requested wiretaps of “political adversaries.” Just as Roosevelt’s 
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previous requests, this included various critics of his New Deal programs, including Cornelius 
Vanderbilt IV (Theoharis 1992, 107 and 108).  
As the United States became increasingly involved in World War II, the FBI’s wartime 
purview expanded beyond internal security and domestic wiretaps. WWII marked the bureau’s 
first foray into international operations. On June 24, 1940, the FBI established the Special 
Intelligence Service (SIS), a division of the bureau that specialized in international undercover 
services. The SIS was created is response to a memorandum by Assistant Secretary of State 
Adolf A. Berle Jr., who relayed President Roosevelt’s request for the FBI to “be responsible for 
foreign intelligence work in the Western Hemisphere”. Two years later, the FBI was admitted to 
operate alongside military intelligence in joint-international counterintelligence.  On November 
25, 1942, three intelligence heads agreed to coordinate counterintelligence operations in the 
western hemisphere between their respective agencies. These actors included Major General 
George V. Strong, the assistant chief of staff for the U.S. Department of War, Rear Admiral H.C. 
Train, the director of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover. 
The arrangement was formally named the “Agreement Between MID, ONI, and FBI for 
Coordinating Special Intelligence Operations in the Western Hemisphere” (CIA 1942). 
Subsequently, in the domain of wartime intelligence operations, these three actors formed the 
primary bargaining group for international intelligence gathering. Previously, the three 
aforementioned intelligence agencies “operated independently, although they did share 
information.” Due to a lack of a master plan by the president or cabinet officials to coordinate 
intelligence collection and analysis, there was a culture of duplicated efforts and “bureaucratic 
rivalries” within government intelligence (Theoharis 1999, 161). The “Agreement Between 
MID, ONI, and FBI for Coordinating Special Intelligence Operations in the Western 
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Hemisphere” provided a blueprint for administrative collaboration and was a relatively major 
step forward for interagency cooperation.  
Around the time of the joint-counterintelligence agreement, the initial SIS directive was 
supplemented with a “Delimitation Agreement,” which clarified the responsibilities of the FBI’s 
SIS as the obtainment of “economic, political, industrial, financial, and subversive information 
and also information concerning movements, organizations, and individuals whose activities are 
prejudicial to the interests of the United States by reasons of espionage, sabotage, or otherwise”. 
The SIS was placed under the immediate jurisdiction of the FBI legal attachés in U.S. Embassies 
throughout the Western Hemisphere. Though the new division creating police liaison networks 
with foreign law enforcement agencies as well as various signal intelligence, or SIGINT, 
networks abroad, the most notable feature of the SIS was the undoubtably the “3,000 confidential 
informants and sources of information” it directed throughout Central and South America. 
Undercover confidential informants and agents began collecting human intelligence, or 
HUMINT, in the Americas related to secret and subversive political activities (CIA 1946).  
SIS intelligence collection was most notably concentrated in Latin America,  where the 
FBI commissioned over 340 undercover operatives. South America, in particular, was a major 
hub for German expats--in over 1.5 million German emigrants had “settled in Brazil and 
Argentina alone”. Over the course of the war, the SIS proved enormously effective. By 1946, the 
SIS had identified 887 Axis spies, 281 propaganda agents, 222 agents smuggling strategic war 
materials, 30 saboteurs, 97 other agents, 24 secret Axis radio stations, 40 enemy radio 
transmitters, and 18 enemy receiving sets (FBI, World War). The FBI disbanded the SIS at the 
end of WWII, but maintained its international presence via legal attachés. As of 1946, the FBI 
had international agents operating from the American Embassies in France, Italy, Portugal, 
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Spain, and England as well as through U.S. Army installations in the Philippine Islands and 
Japan. Moreover, the SIS created a precedential model that influenced the Office of Strategic 
Services--a federal department tasked with foreign intelligence collection and the predecessor 
organization to the Central Intelligence Agency (FBI, World War).  
On September 1, 1947, Special Agent S. Wesley Reynolds, the FBI’s liaison to the 
National Security Agency, was briefed by Colonel Carter Clark, chief of the War Department’s 
military intelligence services, on the VENONA Project--a signal intelligence/SIGINT project run 
by the U.S. Army and NSA that intercepted, decrypted, and translated messages transmitted by 
Soviet intelligence agencies. The VENONA Project was first established by the U.S. Army’s 
Signal Intelligence Service, the predecessor agency of the NSA, on February 1st, 1943, as a 
closed system of intelligence that only included the U.S. Army and the NSA. Col. Clark was first 
motivated to notify the FBI of SIGINT gathering by the NSA due to his interest in Soviet 
codenames intercepted by the bureau that might prove fruitful to the VENONA mission. 
Reynolds provided a list of 200 intercepted codenames to Col. Clark. Interested in the exchange 
of intelligence, FBI Supervising Agent Robert Lamphere eventually made contact with Meredith 
Gardner, an NSA cryptologist and VENONA codebreaker (Fox 2005). Through Lamphere’s 
liaison with Gardner, a great number of Soviet espionage cases opened and, from 1948-1951, 
VENONA uncovered major KGB espionage agents, including “Klaus Fuchs, Harry Gold, David 
Greenglass, Theodore Hall, William Perl, the Rosenbergs, Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean, Kim 
Philby, and Harry D. White” (Benson, 8).  
Despite the inclusion of the FBI, VENONA remained a closed-system and was kept 
secret from both other government agencies and the public. The eventual inclusion of other 
intelligence agencies was limited and gradual. Even the CIA, a later participant in VENONA, 
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was not aware of the VENONA Project until 1952 and was not officially briefed until 1953 
(Benson, 8). VENONA was additionally kept secret from the White House. In his 1949 
memorandum, FBI Special Agent Howard Fletcher described how, upon learning of VENONA, 
Admiral Earl E. Stone, then director of the Armed Forces Security Agency (ASA), argued that 
“President Truman and Adm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, the first director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, should be advised as to the contents of all these messages.” The notion of 
including President Truman and/or the CIA was fought by Brigadier General--formerly colonel--
Carter Clarke as well as Army General Omar Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chief of Staffs. 
Agent Fletcher’s memorandum describes General Bradley’s desire to ensure that “the FBI did 
not ‘handle the material in such a way that Adm. Hillenkoetter or anyone else outside the Army 
Security Agency, [name deleted] and the Bureau [FBI] are aware of the contents of these 
messages and the activity being conducted at Arlington Hall [ASA headquarters]” (Novak 2003). 
Ultimately, VENONA materials were not released to the public until July of 1995 (Benson, 3).  
While this closed-system of intelligence was primarily motivated by fears of infiltration 
of government agencies by KGB agents and assets, the exclusivity of VENONA also kept the 
program from being impeded by the politics, conflicts, and red-tape inherent in bureaucratic 
politics. The key actors involved in the bargaining process of the early VENONA Project 
carefully maintained a three-actor membership--the U.S. Army, the NSA, and the FBI--all of 
whom had shared objectives and none of whom had conflicting agendas. Because of this, 
bureaucratic bargaining was uniquely collaborative and the operation was enormously 
successful. Furthermore, the exclusion of the president from this program was most likely 
opportune for FBI Director Hoover, who no longer wielded the confidant influence in the White 
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House. Going forward, J. Edgar Hoover would rely on other bargaining actors to maneuver his 
way through bureaucratic politics during the Second Red Scare.  
 
The McCarthy Era and the Second Red Scare_________________________________________ 
Following the deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relations after 1945, many Americans believed 
that rising tensions between the United States and USSR could possibly intensify and culminate 
in warfare. Domestically, these fears manifested as paranoia of communists infiltrating the 
United States infrastructure. This era of anti-communist paranoia in the U.S. became known as 
the Second Red Scare, the analogous successor to the First Red Scare in the early 1900s. The 
Second Red Scare inspired revived support for domestic surveillance and proved to be a 
propitious backdrop in the continuity of FBI power, despite new challenges from the White 
House. After President Roosevelt’s death in 1945, J. Edgar Hoover found his bargaining powers 
somewhat capped by the new presidential administration. Hoover failed to cultivate the same 
kind of alliance he had with President Franklin Roosevelt with President Harry Truman. Truman 
allegedly “wanted nothing to do directly with Hoover” and rejected direct contact with him, 
instead directing his military aide, Brigadier General Harry Vaughan, to liaise with the FBI 
director (TIME 1975). Furthermore, President Truman publicly criticized Director Hoover, 
challenging his national reputation and highlighting his abusive bureaucratic maneuvering. Of 
Hoover’s FBI, President Truman once wrote “We want no Gestapo or secret police. FBI is 
tending in that direction. They are dabbling in sex-life scandals and plain blackmail… Edgar 
Hoover would give his right eye to take over, and all congressmen and senators are afraid of 
him” (Summers 2011). Though no record exists of FBI Director Hoover’s position on notifying 
President Truman on the VENONA Project, it is reasonable to speculate that Hoover 
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reciprocated Truman’s distrust and likely supported Brig. General Carter Clarke and General 
Omar Bradley in excluding Truman.  
Despite falling out of favor with the Oval Office, Hoover still maintained sway over the 
rest of the executive branch. At the end of World War II, J. Edgar Hoover began pushing for a 
crackdown and registry on suspected communists in the U.S., mirroring his efforts in the pre-FBI 
General Intelligence Division under Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer. Like his past 
relationship with Attorney General Palmer, J. Edgar Hoover had a very strong working 
relationship with U.S. Attorney General Tom Clark, who later served as a Supreme Court justice, 
and both abetted each other’s administrative power. In March of 1946, Hoover submitted his 
recommendation to Attorney General Clark that he “determine what legislation is available or 
should be sought to institute a program to detain all listed members of the Communist Party and 
any others who might be dangerous.” He particularly emphasized his suspicion of individuals 
holding “important positions in organized labor and civil rights movements, education, churches, 
and the media who have shown sympathy for Communist objectives and policies.” Director 
Hoover stipulated that effective efforts to combat such infiltration by communists would require 
“statutory backing” (Theoharis 1999, 28). In August of 1948, Attorney General Clark gave the 
FBI the authority to compile a “master list” of people suspected of being communists, radicals, 
or generally disloyal to the United States. On July 7, 1950, Hoover submitted a plan to Sidney 
W. Souers, the first director of central intelligence and President Truman’s special national 
security assistant, requesting a “master warrant” for the arrest and permanent detention of nearly 
12,000 “individuals potentially dangerous to national security.” The requested proclamation 
would effectively suspend the Writ of Habeas Corpus, which protects individuals against 
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unlawful detention by the state (Weiner 2007). Truman was strongly opposed to this proposition 
and did not permit the suspension of Habeas Corpus.  
Despite President Truman’s resistance to Hoover’s anti-radical initiatives, the legislative and 
judicial branches of government were allied with the FBI director’s interests. On September 12, 
1950, Congress passed the McCarran Internal Security Act, which granted much of Hoover’s 
proposition.  
• The Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 987, Public Law 81-831, (1950): This law 
“authorized the forced deportation of alien radicals; barred communists from employment 
in defense industries and from securing passports; required communist, communist-front, 
and communist-action organizations to register as foreign agents with a specially created 
Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB), to submit lists of their members to the 
SACB, and to label their publications as communist propaganda; and authorized the 
detention of dangerous radicals during presidentially declared national emergencies” 
(Theoharis 1999, 27).  
President Truman vetoed the McCarran Act on September 22, 1950. Nevertheless, both the 
House of Representatives and the Senate overrode the president’s veto and the McCarran 
Internal Security Act was officially enacted. The day after the legislative override, President 
Truman responded to the McCarran Act in his September 23, 1950 “Speech on the Veto of the 
Internal Security Act.” In his address, Truman stated “the application of the [act’s] registration 
requirements to so-called communist-front organizations can be the greatest danger to freedom 
of speech, press and assembly, since the Alien and Sedition Laws of 1798” (Truman 1950). 
President Truman’s warning fell on deaf ears and the national legislature became enveloped in an 
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anti-Communist craze that included very few qualms with the sidestepping of due process and 
civil rights in the quest to stomp out the perceived Communist threat 
In 1953, Senator Joseph McCarthy was appointed chairman of the Senate Committee on 
Government Operations and dominated the American political landscape with his fiery anti-
communist rhetoric and rabid purge of suspected communist-sympathizers. Though it would 
seem that their mutual interest in cleansing the United States of communist infiltrators would 
make J. Edgar Hoover obvious bargaining allies with Joseph McCarthy and Roy Cohn, the 
relationship between the three men has been disputed. J. Edgar Hoover supported Senator 
McCarthy early on in his political career and it is believed that J. Edgar Hoover, impressed by 
Roy Cohn’s prosecution of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg as an assistant U.S. attorney for the 
Southern District of New York, recommended Cohn for the position of Senator McCarthy’s chief 
counsel (Meroney 2006 and Logue). However, Hoover’s support for McCarthy seems to have 
weakened as the senator for Wisconsin became more overzealous. Cartha DeLoach, associate 
director of the FBI and Hoover’s third-in-command, has asserted that J. Edgar Hoover was 
actually dismissive and resentful toward McCarthy and Cohn. In a letter criticizing a portrayal of 
his former boss in the X-Files, DeLoach described Hoover’s animosity toward McCarthy, 
writing, “Hoover chastised McCarthy for claiming there were two hundred and eighty three 
communists in the Department of State…Hoover made McCarthy back down and admit this was 
simply a ‘laundry list’ he had been reading from.” DeLoach also described Roy Cohn as an 
ineffectual and insignificant member of the bargaining group, stating “Hoover would also have 
nothing to do with Roy Cohn. He never provided any information to either McCarthy or 
Cohn…Cohn tried to see Hoover several times, but was always shunted off to L.B. Nichols, an 
assistant, who got rid of him fast…Cohn never had any influence on the FBI” (DeLoach 1998).  
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It is likely that J. Edgar Hoover came to dislike Senator McCarthy for his detrimental effect 
on Communist Party investigations. Herbert Philbrick, an adman commissioned by the FBI to 
spy on the Communist Party of the United States, described how the Communist leaders he knew 
believed that “McCarthy has helped them a great deal…McCarthy's kind of attacks add greatly 
to the confusion, putting up a smokescreen for the party and making it more difficult than ever 
for people to discern who is a communist and who is not” (Meroney 2006). For whatever reason, 
there is no record to support that Director Hoover was a direct cohort of Senator McCarthy at the 
height of McCarthyism. The image of Hoover, McCarthy, and Cohn as a close-knit triumvirate 
of terror during the Second Red Scare is a misconception and J. Edgar Hoover and the 
McCarthyites should be considered as separate camps in the bureaucratic political process.  
Despite McCarthy’s purportedly detrimental effective on FBI investigations, his impact and 
influence in Congress established a legislative culture of gung-ho and fervent anti-Communism 
that benefited J. Edgar Hoover’s policymaking agenda. On August 24, 1954, Congress passed 
the Communist Control Act, which criminalized affiliation with the Communist Party. The act 
was signed into law by President Dwight Eisenhower.  
• The Communist Control Act, 68 Stat. 775, 50 U.S.C. 841-844 (1954): This law formally 
outlawed the membership and support for the Communist Party of the United States on 
the basis that such affiliation is a threat to national security. Furthermore, the act denied 
the Communist Party “or any successors of such party regardless of the assumed name, 
whose object or purpose is to overthrow the Government of the United States, or the 
government of any State, Territory, District, or possession thereof, or the government of 
any political subdivision therein by force and violence” the “rights, privileges, and 
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immunities attendant upon legal bodies created under the jurisdiction of the laws of the 
United States or any political subdivision thereof” (GPO 1954, 776).  
The Communist Control Act of 1954, combined with the McCarran Internal Security Act of 
1950, effectively provided the statutory framework for the Second Red Scare. However, despite 
strong legislative support for Hoover’s plan as per the McCarran Act and Communist Control 
Act, the “laws did not, in fact, shift the FBI’s role from intelligence gathering to law 
enforcement” and Hoover’s plans never came to fruition. This is partly due to a change in 
legislative actors. Republicans, the primary supporters of McCarthyism, “lost control of the 
Senate in the midterm elections” in November 1954 and McCarthy was replaced as chairman of 
the Senate Committee on Government Operations before being censured by his fellow senators 
in December (Britannica 2000). With the loss of his Republican allies in the U.S. Senate, Hoover 
had lost the support of legislative actors in the bureaucratic bargaining process for his suspension 
of Habeas Corpus. However, the most primary explanation for the lack of enforcement of the 
McCarran and Communist Control acts was the judicial branch acting in the bargaining group 
against the interests of Hoover and the former legislature, as “the prosecutive option was 
foreclosed by a series of Supreme Court rulings-- in particular the Court’s 1965 ruling in 
Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board.” In  Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control 
Board, 382 U.S. 70 (1965), the Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB) sought to compel 
William Albertson and Roscoe Quincy Proctor, alleged members of the Communist Party of the 
USA, to register as members of a “communist action organization,” as defined by the McCarran 
Act. Albertson and Proctor refused to register, asserting their Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination.  The Court ruled in favor of Albertson and Proctor, holding that compulsory 
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registration, as stipulated by the McCarran Act, did in fact constitute self-incrimination and was 
therefore a violation of Fifth Amendment rights (Theoharis 1999, 27-28).  
Furthermore, the Court addressed the detention clause in Jencks v. U.S., again declining to 
rule in Hoover’s favor. In Jencks v. U.S., 353 U.S. 657 (1957), two undercover FBI agents 
charged union leader Clinton Jencks with falsely filing an Affidavit of Non-Communist Union 
Officer with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Jencks’ request to review the 
testimonial reports of the informants’ evidence was denied and he was found guilty on two 
counts of communist activity, thus violating the Communist Control Act. After a series of 
appeals, Clinton Jencks’ case was reviewed by the Supreme Court. The Court ruled that, because 
the documents could potentially contain information that discredited the testimony of the FBI 
informants, the defendant had the right to review them (Oyez, 2019). The court’s ruling in Jencks 
further deterred prosecution and invalidated the bulk of the FBI’s anti-communist undercover 
operations due to the admissibility of sealed testimonial evidence.  
The combined effect of these rulings impeded the ability of executive agencies, like the FBI, 
to enforce anti-communist statutes and the Supreme Court emerged as the most definitive actor 
in Second Red Scare bargaining process. Unlike in the bargaining for wiretapping powers under 
FDR, J. Edgar Hoover was unable to subvert the Court’s decisions and, therefore, was unable to 
garner the authority to apprehend the individuals of his security index program. The invalidation 
of the anti-communist legislation marked one of the first instances of Hoover being defeated in 







On March 8, 1971, the Citizens’ Commission to Investigate the FBI, a radical activist 
group, broke into the FBI’s resident office in Media, Pennsylvania and stole documents that 
“documented the FBI’s widespread surveillance of domestic groups, including left-wing 
organizations and black militant groups” (Theoharis 1999, 188). The release of this information 
understandably led to a public outcry. Carl Stern, a reporter for NBC, followed up on the 
released documents by filing a FOIA lawsuit aimed at disclosing other documents associated 
with the domestic surveillance of political organizations. Stern’s suit as well as various other 
FOIA requests led to the release of “tens of thousands of pages” of documents detailing the 
FBI’s most controversial and notorious programs--COINTELPRO (Theoharis 1999, 188).  
COINTELPRO, an abbreviated codename for “counterintelligence program,” was 
originally authorized by Director Hoover on August 28, 1956 to undermine communist influence 
by disrupting and discrediting the activities of the Communist Party (Theoharis 1999, 29). The 
irony of COINTELPRO is that it began when the Communist Party was arguably at its weakest 
state. COINTELPRO was initiated shortly after Nikita Khrushchev gave his famous 1956 “On 
the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences” speech, the first acknowledgement by the Soviet 
government of Joseph Stalin’s abuses of power. The exposure of communist atrocities hampered 
socialist idealism in the United States and the Communist Party’s membership was reduced to 
only twenty-two thousand members--one-fifth of the membership’s size during its peak years in 
the 1940s (Cunningham 2004, 28).  
Despite the lessened impact of communists in the United States, the fears of communist 
infiltration of government continued to pervade the American mindset. However, also due to the 
diminished influence of the American communist party, the FBI’s counterintelligence activities 
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were primarily political rather than criminal. Without the need for prosecutorial framework, 
Director Hoover’s counterintelligence proposals for a centralized, closed system of 
counterintelligence were exempted from the need for legal justifications and received minimal 
political opposition (Cunningham 2004, 28). Hoover provided the following report to President 
Dwight Eisenhower and his cabinet, inexplicitly explaining COINTELPRO:  
“[The] program [is] designed to intensify confusion and dissatisfaction among its 
members. . . . Selective informants were briefed and trained to raise controversial issues 
within the Party. In the process, they may be able to advance themselves to high 
positions. The Internal Revenue Service was furnished the names and addresses of Party 
functionaries. . . . Based on this information, investigations have been instituted in 262 
possible income tax evasion cases. Anticommunist literature and simulated Party 
documents were mailed anonymously to carefully chosen members” (Cunningham 2004, 
28).  
For the period of COINTELPRO in which the Communist Party was the exclusive target, 
both the executive and legislative branches of government were in accordance in regard to the 
program’s goal and scope. By the end of 1956, the Community Party’s membership was further 
reduced to just 4,000-6,000 members. The FBI attributed this extreme reduction to the success of 
COINTELPRO and, in 1961, Hoover sought to expand the scope of COINTELPRO operations 
to other factions. The second organization targeted was the Socialist Workers Party (SWP). 
However, this expansion of COINTELPRO involved significantly less consultation with 
government officials outside of the bureau. Notably, the FBI began surveilling and infiltrating 
the SWP without notifying Attorney General Robert Kennedy, who had formerly been informed 
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of COINTELPRO operations against the Communist Party and had approved of the program 
without objections (Cunningham 2004, 29).  
Over time, Hoover began conflating a wider set of organizations with the communist 
threat and COINTELPRO began surveilling and infiltrating an expansive registry of 
organizations. The groups monitored included the American Nazi Party, the Black Panthers, the 
John Birch Society, Ku Klux Klan, the National Rifle Association, the Nation of Islam, and 
“every major organization associated with civil rights actions in the South, along with the New 
York-based National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)” 
(Cunningham 2004, 273-276 and 30). As part of COINTELPRO, the FBI sought to silence 
prominent public influencers through blackmail and discreditation. In 1964, after COINTELPRO 
surveillance procured evidence of Martin Luther King Jr.’s infidelity, FBI Assistant Director 
William C. Sullivan wrote a letter to King informing the civil rights leader that he had “34 days” 
to commit suicide or else his extramarital sexual liaisons would be revealed to the public (Gage 
2014). Fred Hampton, the Central Committee Chief of Staff of the Black Panther Party, was also 
targeted by the bureau. The FBI directed informant William O’Neal to infiltrate the Black 
Panthers and ingratiate himself with Hampton. Through O’Neal, the bureau undermined 
Hampton’s coalitions with other black activist groups and incited internal disputes. The FBI’s 
operation against Fred Hampton and the Black Panther became increasingly aggressive until, on 
December 3, 1963, William O’Neal drugged Fred Hampton in his apartment. Shortly after, 
officers associated with an FBI task force raided the apartment and executed Hampton by 
shooting him in the head while he was unconscious (National Archives).  
Shortly after the exposure of the FBI’s COINTELPRO operations, Director J. Edgar 
Hoover found himself at war with the White House over deniability of President Nixon’s role in 
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the FBI’s less-than-legal investigations. Previously, on June 5, 1970, President Nixon tasked J. 
Edgar Hoover, CIA Director Richard Helms, and military intelligence officials with “getting 
better information on domestic dissenters and directed them to determine whether they were 
subject to foreign influence.” Later that month, in response to Nixon’s request, the intelligences 
agencies compiled a special report to the White House detailing a list of options that “ranged 
from the innocuous to the extreme, from doing nothing to violating the civil liberties of 
American citizens.” Tom Charles Huston, a Nixon aide, authored a memorandum, later known as 
the “Huston Plan,” to President Nixon, which counseled Nixon to employ the most aggressive 
intelligence strategies from the special report. Nixon initially authorized the intelligence 
community to initiate the Huston Plan, though revoked this authorization five days later at the 
insistence of both the Attorney General John N. Mitchell and, notably, Director J. Edgar Hoover 
(U.S. Senate 1975a, 1). Hoover opposed the Huston Plan due to his belief that the coordination 
was “too risky” and “leaks to the press…would be damaging.” President Nixon recalled the 
Huston Plan authorization on the basis that Hoover’s opposition “subverted [Nixon’s] strategy of 
deniability” and implicated his administration in illegal investigations that had been functioning 
long before his presidency (Theoharis 1999, 35).   
In October of 1971, President Richard Nixon and officials in the White House, including 
Attorney General John N. Mitchell, strongly considered requesting Director Hoover’s resignation 
on the basis of both scandals and Hoover’s age (he was 76 years-old). However, when G. 
Gordon Liddy, a former FBI agent turned Nixon operative, provided President Nixon with a 
memorandum profiling Director Hoover’s personality and leadership, Nixon saw the potential 
for blackmail and the retaliatory disclosure of Hoover’s files on the Nixon Administration. In his 
reaction to Liddy’s memorandum, President Nixon told his aides that it made "a stronger case for 
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not doing something on Hoover than doing something…We may have on our hands here a man 
who will pull down the temple with him, including me” (Wines 1991, 2). President Nixon 
decided to postpone his demand for Hoover’s resignation “until after the 1972 presidential 
election” to avoid any political repercussions that may arise as a result of the ouster (Theoharis 
1999, 153). However, on May 2, 1972, Director J. Edgar Hoover died of a heart attack. When 
informed of Hoover’s death, President Nixon privately proclaimed “Jesus Christ! That old 























Part II - The Interim Period 
Year of Intelligence: The Church Committee__________________________________________ 
Despite Director Hoover’s death, the FBI’s relationship with the White House continued 
to be a point of rising public controversy, culminating in multiple exposures as a result of 
congressional inquiries. During the 1973-1974 Watergate Hearings, the Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign Activities procured documents from White House Counsel John Dean 
“that showed how earlier presidential administrations had misused the FBI, and also that FBI 
Director Hoover maintained in his office files containing derogatory information on public 
officials” (Theoharis 1999, 128). These documents included two memoranda authored by 
Assistant FBI Director William Sullivan, who had described how President Franklin Roosevelt 
and Lyndon Johnson had exploited the bureau for political purposes. Nixon and Dean’s strategy 
was meant to demonstrate how previous presidential administrations had used the FBI in similar 
engagements, including FBI-coordinated burglaries, aka “black bag jobs,”  perpetrated under the 
Kennedy and Johnson presidencies that paralleled the Watergate break-in (Theoharis 1999, 128). 
The testimonies of Nixon officials and production of evidence during the Watergate Hearings 
brought numerous instances of FBI misconduct to light. This, in addition to the prior exposure of 
COINTELPRO, led to a legislative crackdown on the bureau. On January 27, 1975, the U.S. 
Senate established the Senate Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to 
Intelligence Activities. Chaired by Senator Frank Church from Idaho, the committee’s activities 
became known as the Church Committee Hearings. The House of Representatives also 
established an investigative committee, the House Select Committee on Intelligence--or the Pike 
Committee, to examine alleged malfeasance by intelligence agencies, though the Pike 
Committee’s final report was sealed by a vote to suppress its contents due to a lack of executive 
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review. The Church Committee inquiry was more successful in the obtainment of information, 
presentation of findings, and subsequent impact of intelligence reforms in the United States 
(Theoharis 1999, 128).  
The Church Committee investigated all prominent national intelligence agencies, 
including the Department of Defense, CIA, NSA, FBI, and the Bureau of Narcotics and 
Dangerous Drugs. The Church Committee focused its investigation of the FBI foremost on the 
COINTELPRO programs, but also uncovered various other controversial operations. The FBI 
had collaborated with other agencies of the American Intelligence Community, most primarily 
the National Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency, to procure sensitive 
information extracted from illegal intelligence operations. This included telegraphic 
communications that had been intercepted by the NSA as part of Project SHAMROCK. The 
messages intercepted by Project SHAMROCK were disseminated to “the DoD, the CIA, the 
[FBI], the Secret Service, and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (a precursor of the 
Drug Enforcement Administration).” Furthermore, the “inclusion of the FBI and the Bureau of 
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs [was] especially noteworthy, as their mission included mostly 
domestic targets” (Owen 2012, 34).  
In addition to collecting the telegraphic data of citizen communications provided by 
SHAMROCK, the FBI also collaborated with the CIA on Project HTLINGUAL; a mail opening 
program. According to a May 4, 1956 memorandum, authored by the Director of the CIA and 
later examined by the Church Committee, HTLINGUAL was a “sensitive project involving the 
analysis of mail entering New York City from the Soviet Union…While the project was 
originally designed to examine and record information from only the outside of the envelopes, 
for some time selected openings have been conducted and the contents examined…This is, of 
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course, without the knowledge of the postal authorities” (U.S. Senate 1975b, 18 and 19). Just as 
with SHAMROCK, the FBI was not a direct extractor of mail contents, but was provided intel 
based on the interceptions by the CIA. According to a separate memorandum detailing a May 19, 
1971 meeting, CIA Director Richard Helms “asked, who outside of CIA knows about the 
HTLINGUAL operation or gets its material” and was told by a CIA officer associated with the 
project “only the FBI.” (Exhibit 9, U.S. Senate 1975b, 206). In all, the Church Committee 
conducted over 800 interviews and over 250 executive hearings, and procured over 110,000 
documents. The final report of the Church Committee proposed a total of 183 recommendations 
to reform American intelligence agencies. The accounts of FBI misconduct are detailed in Book 
III of the Church Committee’s final report, describing COINTELPRO, the Huston Plan, 
HITLINGUAL, SHAMROCK, and the “use of informants, electronic surveillance, [and] 
surreptitious entries” (Theoharis 1999, 129).  
Several intelligence reforms were initiated in the aftermath of the Church Committee. At 
the legislative level, the Senate passed Resolution 400 in 1976, permanently “establishing the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” a committee designed to maintain “vigilant legislative 
oversight over the intelligence activities of the United States to assure that such activities are in 
conformity with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Two years later, Congress 
passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) which required “the executive branch to 
request warrants for wiretapping and surveillance purposes from a newly formed FISA Court.” 
FISA was signed into law by President Jimmy Carter (U.S. Senate 2019). In addition to 
overarching changes to federal intelligence practices, the findings of the Church Committee 
resulted in various administrative and structural changes specific to the FBI. Investigations of 
domestic radical and terrorist organizations were transferred from the Intelligence Division to the 
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General Investigative Division, where the operations would be subject to the legal parameters of 
a criminal investigation complete with a prosecutorial framework. Domestic security 
investigations underwent a review and drastic overhaul, reducing the bureau’s active domestic 
security investigations from 21,000 to “300 by the end of 1976” (Theoharis 1999, 129).  
The Church Committee also proposed superior congressional oversight of the FBI as well 
as a legislative charter to codify legal boundaries for FBI operations and “delineate the FBI’s 
powers, functions, and responsibilities, with the attorney general [and the president] having the 
discretion to issue specific rules governing how to carry out authorized investigations” 
(Theoharis 1999, 129). As per the recommendations, Congress established permanent 
intelligence committees with the authority to monitor the operations of U.S. intelligence 
agencies, including the FBI. The committee’s proposition regarding specific rules issued by the 
attorney general to dictate the standards and limitations of domestic security investigations 
became a formal practice on April 5, 1976. These directives became known as the attorney 
general’s guidelines or “Levi Guidelines…named after Attorney General Edward Levi” 
(Theoharis 1999, 129). The Levi Guidelines restricted the procedures the FBI could use and 
“distinguished three types of domestic security investigations: 1) preliminary investigations, 2) 
limited investigations, and 3) full investigations.”  Furthermore, the guidelines only permitted the 
bureau to initiate full domestic security investigations if there were “specific and articulable facts 
giving reason to believe that an individual or group is or may be engaged in activities which 
involve the use of force or violence” (OIG 2005). Interestingly, a legislative charter to formally 
define the FBI’s structure and powers was never enacted. A formal charter would have 
unambiguously established an inflexible organizational structure to clearly demarcate the FBI’s 
authority, as had traditionally been the practice in cases where the president or attorney general 
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authorized executive orders or guidelines. Because of this failure to codify the FBI’s 
administration, the nature of the bureau remained relatively nebulous in spite of the reforms.   
 
The FBI in the 1980s_____________________________________________________________ 
Because Congress failed to enact a legislative charter clearly defining the FBI’s 
jurisdiction and structure, the bureau continuously tested the boundaries of its amorphous 
investigative authority throughout the eighties and nineties. On February 3, 1980, the FBI 
operation ABSCAM was revealed to the public by a New York Times report. The article 
described how several public officials, including U.S. Senator Harrison A. Williams and seven 
members of the U.S. House of Representatives, were implicated in an undercover operation in 
which FBI agents “posed as businessmen and Arab sheiks willing to pay bribes” (Maitland 1980, 
1). While much of the country lauded the bureau for its success in bringing down multiple 
corrupt politicians, ABSCAM became a subject of multiple controversies. ABSCAM raised 
numerous questions about “the uses, and potential abuses, of undercover tactics” by the FBI 
(Maitland 1982, 4).  At the heart of the controversy over the bureau’s undercover activities in 
ABSCAM was the issue of entrapment; the FBI had effectively enticed those indicted in 
ABSCAM to commit criminal offenses and, subsequently, there would be insufficient evidence 
of corruption if not for the agency’s operation. Furthermore, there was concern that the FBI, in 
targeting politicians, may have been influenced by a “vendetta against Congress”--perhaps in 




In response to the renewed concerns about the FBI’s use of informants in undercover 
operations, Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti issued revised attorney general guidelines. The 
Civiletti Guidelines formalized the procedures for the use of undercover informants and required 
that federal prosecutors coordinate informant activity, stating:   
“In any matter presented to a United States Attorney or other federal prosecutor for legal 
action . . . where the matter has involved the use of an informant or a confidential source 
in any way or degree, the FBI shall take the initiative to provide full disclosure to the 
federal prosecutor concerning the nature and scope of the informant's or confidential 
source's participation in the matter” (U.S. Senate 1983, 539) 
Due to various crimes committed by FBI informants under the pretense of immunity, the 
Civiletti Guidelines also mandated that FBI officials handling informants must “advise 
informants that their relationship with the FBI would not protect them from arrest or prosecution 
for any violation of federal, state, or local law, except insofar as a field supervisor or SAC 
determined pursuant to appropriate Attorney General Guidelines that the informant's criminal 
activity was justified” (OIG 2005).  
Critics of the FBI during the ABSCAM controversy, such as the American Civil Liberties 
Union, suggested that legislation should be passed governing the use of undercover agents, 
similar to the laws that mandated warrants for wiretapping in criminal investigations. Several 
justice department officials, including FBI Director William Webster and Associate Attorney 
General Rudolph Giuliani, opposed such suggestions, arguing that the proposed legislation to 
restrict undercover operations would impede the investigations of white-collar crime and official 
corruption.  Giuliani stated, “The question of how and when to investigate is a matter for the 
executive branch except when it collides with Fourth Amendment protections against search and 
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seizure…there is no constitutional right not to be investigated” (Maitland 1982, 4). In response to 
the ABSCAM controversy, two congressional committees, a Select Senate Committee to Study 
Undercover Activities and the House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights within 
the Judiciary Committee, were mobilized to examine the limits of undercover operations by the 
FBI.  
The Senate’s final report in 1983 was supportive of the FBI’s undercover activities, 
finding “that undercover operations of the United States Department of Justice have substantially 
contributed to the detection, investigation, and prosecution of criminal activity…some use of the 
undercover technique is indispensable to the achievement of effective law enforcement” (U.S. 
Senate 1983, 22). The House subcommittee was less supportive and questioned the value of the 
Civiletti Guidelines issued by the attorney general, finding “a pattern of widespread deviation 
from avowed standards, with substantial harm to individuals…and insensitivity regarding 
interference in the political and judicial processes” (U.S. House 1984, 14). The report 
recommended legislation requiring judicial authorization before an undercover operation could 
be initiated” (U.S. House 1984, 14 and Theoharis 1999, 132). No such legislation was enacted 
and undercover operations by the FBI remained reliant on the standards set by the attorney 
general’s guidelines.  
Throughout the late seventies and early eighties, there was a rising concern of Islamic 
fundamentalism following the rise of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in the Iranian Revolution of 
1978. In addition to--and often as a result of--the rise of anti-west theocracies, terrorism became 
a growing issue in the United States. By 1978, when William H. Webster was appointed director 
of the FBI, over “a hundred terrorist attacks a year were taking place in the United States” and, 
“by the mid-1970s, terrorist bombs were being set off in the country at an average rate of 50 to 
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60 a year” (Jenkins 2015). In stark contrast with congressional attitudes during the Church 
Committee Hearings, the national government in the 1980s was much more suggestible to re-
empowering the investigative authority of the FBI. Republicans, who took control of the U.S. 
Senate following the 1980 senatorial elections, and President Ronald Reagan, who had formerly 
lambasted his predecessor’s failure to contain national security threats in his 1980 presidential 
campaign, strongly supported a deregulation of national intelligence agencies.  
Following the congressional inquiries on ABSCAM and informant procedures, another 
senate inquiry was initiated on June 24, 1982 to examine the FBI’s domestic security powers. 
Whereas the previous inquiries were based on fear that the FBI had too much discretion in 
undercover informant operations, the 1982 and 1983 hearings of the Senate Subcommittee on 
Security and Terrorism were based on concerns that the Levi and Civiletti Guidelines "unduly 
restricted the FBI's authority to monitor and prevent potential terror or violence against persons 
and property in the United States,” primarily due to the necessity of a “criminal predicate to 
initiate an investigation” (OIG 2005). In its final assessment of the attorney general’s guidelines, 
the Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism found that, while the guidelines were 
"necessary and desirable," they should “be revised to delete the criminal standard for initiating 
domestic security investigations; extend time limits for investigations, particularly those for 
preliminary and limited investigations; lower the evidentiary threshold for initiating limited 
investigations; relax restrictions on the recruitment and use of new informants; and authorize 
investigations of systematic advocacy of violence, alleged anarchists, or other activities 
calculated to weaken or undermine federal or state governments” (U.S. Senate 1984, 34-35 and 
OIG 2005). In accordance with the Senate’s recommendations, the Civiletti Guidelines were 
formally revised by the Reagan Administration in March 1983. The attorney general’s 
46 
 
guidelines, now called the Smith Guidelines after Attorney General William French Smith, 
“granted the FBI greater latitude to initiate domestic security and terrorism investigations” 
(Theoharis 1999, 130).  
In January 1988, the FBI disclosed to the Center for Constitutional Rights that the bureau 
had, in the early eighties, investigated the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El 
Salvador (CISPES), a U.S. activist organization that opposed the Reagan Administration’s 
foreign policy as it pertained to support for right-wing political movements in Central America. 
The pretense for the CISPES investigation was originally rooted in suspicions that the group had 
violated the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, which mandates that “individuals doing 
political or advocacy work on behalf of foreign entities in the United States” must “register with 
the Department of Justice” and “disclose their relationship, activities, receipts, and disbursements 
in support of their activities” (Theoharis 1999, 134 and Straus 2019, 1). As the CISPES was 
surveilled, the FBI began to believe that the organization served as a front for a terrorist program 
devised to supported the Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation, El Salvador’s leftist 
political party, through international terrorism. The FBI zealously employed numerous 
investigative techniques, including the monitoring of individuals and infiltration of public 
activities, to gather intelligence on the CISPES under the security provisions of the Smith 
Guidelines. The bureau’s file on the CISPES investigation confirmed a “pattern of surveillance 
reminiscent of the Bureau during the Hoover era” (Theoharis 1999, 134).  
The release of the CISPES files led to numerous re-evaluations of the FBI’s scope of 
authority in light of the multiple congressional hearings on FBI procedures, including an internal 
inquiry launched by the agency, a Senate inquiry by the Select Committee on Intelligence, and a 
House of Representatives inquiry by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. In 
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September 1988, FBI Director William Sessions disclosed to the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence that the FBI’s internal inquiry determined that the initial investigation 
was likely unwarranted because it was contingent on information provided by Frank Varelli, an 
improperly vetted FBI informant who was later found to be unreliable, and that the “scope of the 
investigation was unnecessarily broadened in October 1983,” a misdirection that further mirrored 
the tendencies of the FBI’s former COINTELPRO investigations (Theoharis 1999, 134).  Both 
congressional committees found that the CISPES fiasco was a result of internal mismanagement 
and found a total of 31 violations of the attorney general’s guidelines. The Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence stressed the importance of the attorney general’s guidelines in FBI 
functions, stating in their final report:  
“Federal laws do not regulate most of the FBI's standard investigative methods, including 
photographic and visual surveillance, trash checks, the use of informants and undercover 
agents, attendance at meetings and infiltration of groups, interviews of individuals and 
their employers and associates, and checks of various law enforcement, license, utility, 
and credit records. Investigations such as the CISPES case using these methods are 
governed by internal FBI policies and by guidelines issued by the Attorney General. 
Violations are normally punishable only by internal disciplinary action. The CISPES 
investigation demonstrated the vital importance of adherence to policies and guidelines 
that keep the FBI from making unjustified inquiries into political activities and 
associations” (U.S. Senate 1989, 12).  
Following the controversy of the CISPES investigation, the Attorney General Dick Thornburgh 
and Department of Justice established yet another revised set of attorney general’s guidelines, the 
Thornburgh Guidelines, which provided guidance on the conditions to initiate a terrorism 
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investigation, the information that may be collected, and the reporting standards of domestic 
security operations. Furthermore, to counter the internal mismanagement that had misguided the 
CISPES investigation, the Thornburgh guidelines required authorizations by either the FBI 
director or assistant director to initiate and renew terrorism investigations (Thornburgh 1989). 
The Thornburgh Guidelines went into effect on March 21, 1989.  
 
The FBI in the 1990s_____________________________________________________________ 
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the FBI domesticized its focuses and 
reassigned 300 agents “from foreign counterintelligence duties to [national] violent crime 
investigations” (FBI 2015). Over the past decade, the United States had experienced a 40% 
increase in violent crime. This violent crime wave peaked in 1991 “at 716 violent crimes per 
100,000” (Friedman 2017, 1). To combat the epidemic of violence, federal law enforcement 
sought to combine its crimefighting efforts with local and state law enforcement agencies. In 
January of 1992, the FBI launched the Safe Streets Violent Crimes Initiative, a program that 
enabled the Special Agents in Charge of each FBI field office to sponsor long-term joint-task 
forces comprised of law enforcement officials from agencies at all levels of government that 
would investigate “violent gangs, crimes of violence, and the apprehension of violent fugitives” 
(Ashley 2003).  
In the next two years, the FBI would once again find itself in the center of national 
controversy in two infamous cases of lethal force by the bureau. On August 21, 1992, a firefight 
broke out in the mountains of Northern Idaho between federal law enforcement and the family of 
Randy Weaver, an anti-government militiaman who was being investigated for failure to appear 
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in court. Weaver had previously been arrested in 1989 for illegally selling weapons to an 
informant of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF). When he refused 
to cooperate with the ATF as an informant in their investigation of the Aryan Nations, Weaver 
was indicted. When he declined to appear for his trial on February 20, 1991, Weaver became a 
fugitive of the United States Marshals Service (USMS). On August 21, 1992, when the U.S. 
Marshals attempted to apprehend Randy Weaver at his cabin in Ruby Ridge, Idaho, the Weaver 
Family and the USMS agents opened fire on each other. One the first day of the eleven-day 
siege, Randy Weaver’s fourteen year-old son Sammy Weaver and Deputy U.S. Marshal Bill 
Degan were both killed (DOJ 1994, 3). The killing of DUSM Bill Degan led to the FBI’s 
involvement in Ruby Ridge. On August 22, 1992, the day after the FBI became involved, FBI 
Hostage Response Team (HRT) Agent Lon Horiuchi fatally sniped Randy Weaver’s wife, Vick 
Weaver, while she held her ten month-old infant daughter (Freeh 1995, 4-5). The siege finally 
ended on August 31, 1997 with the surrender of the Weaver Family (DOJ 1994, 4).  
Less than one year after the Ruby Ridge disaster, on February 28, 1993, federal law 
enforcement agents became involved in yet another violent siege, this time with the Branch 
Davidians, a cult of religious fanatics led by David Koresh. On February 28, 1993, the ATF 
attempted to execute an arrest warrant for Koresh for the “ unlawful possession of a destructive 
device, in violation of 26 United States Code, section 5845(f)” (Scruggs 1993). The Branch 
Davidians of the Mount Carmel compound opened fire on the ATF, killing four agents and 
initiating a violent siege that lasted fifty-one days. The FBI Crisis Management Team (CMT) 
arrived at the scene in the evening of February 28 and assumed management of the standoff. 
Initially, the FBI’s HRT personnel sought to establish a dialogue with David Koresh to resolve 
the matter peacefully. However, the attempts to diffuse the situation diplomatically failed and, on 
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April 19, 1993, the FBI HRT launched the final assault on Mount Carmel. The HRT agents 
attempted to break down the walls of the compound with grenade launchers and use CS gas to 
flush out the Branch Davidians. Amid the assault, fire broke out inside the compound. From both 
fire, smoke inhalation, and shooting, seventy-six members of the Branch Davidian sect were 
killed, including David Koresh (Scruggs 1993).  
Following both accounts of lethal force by the FBI, numerous questions and 
controversies were raised. In 1995, the U.S. Department of Justice and the surviving members of 
the Weaver Family reached an “out-of-court settlement of $3.1 million,” though continued to 
deny any wrongdoing in the Ruby Ridge standoff (Theoharis 1999, 139). The bureau’s position 
was reversed following the change in directorship from William Sessions to Louis Freeh. In 
January of 1995, Director Freeh announced that twelve employees of the FBI would face 
disciplinary actions. However, in his testimony before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on 
Terrorism, Technology, and Government Information, Freeh denied allegations of criminal 
misconduct, citing “inadequate performance, improper judgment, neglect of duty, and failure to 
exert proper managerial oversight” as the key reasons for the mishandling of Ruby Ridge (Freeh 
1995, 7-8). The federal government’s conclusion was not unanimously shared with other levels 
of government and, when the U.S. Department of Justice declined to charge him for killing of 
Vicki Weaver, FBI HRT Special Agent Lon Horiuchi was indicted for manslaughter by the 
Boundary County District Attorney’s Office in 1997. This led to questions regarding criminal 
immunity and federal supremacy in prosecution. Ultimately, the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of 
Appeals found that Horiuchi was “entitled to immunity from criminal prosecution” (Weinstein 
2000). The court held that Horiuchi was acting “within the scope of his duties” and that the 
killing of Vicki Weaver was deemed “necessary and proper under the circumstances” (Idaho v. 
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Horiuchi 2000). Simultaneously with the Ruby Ridge inquiries, Congress and the Department of 
Justice also evaluated the Waco Siege in 1995. In addition to internal departmental reviews, the 
House of Representatives Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Crime and the Committee on 
Government Reform and Oversight’s Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, 
and Criminal Justice jointly held hearings on the Waco incident to assess the Department of 
Justice’s handling of the siege and the committees’ final report found that, while David Koresh 
and the Branch Davidians were ultimately responsible for the deaths at Mount Carmel, the 
“FBI’s strategy decisions during the 51-day standoff were flawed and highly irresponsible” and 
the “Attorney General’s decision to assault the complex on April 19, 1993, was premature, 
wrong, and highly irresponsible” (Danforth 2000, 189). 
The findings that the FBI had been legally justified on all accounts of lethal force led to 
concern that the FBI had validity as a paramilitary force. Despite the judicial support for the FBI, 
the American public was highly skeptical of federal law enforcement and the scandals fueled the 
rise of anti-government militias and terrorism. On April 19, 1995, the second anniversary of the 
Waco fire, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols bombed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building 
in Oklahoma City. The explosion killed 168 people, including eight federal law enforcement 
agents--none of whom were FBI agents (Romano 1997). The attack was viewed by the 
perpetrators as retribution against the federal government for both Ruby Ridge and Waco and 
this connection brought the cases back into media focus. Moreover, distrust of federal law 
enforcement was not limited to fringe militiamen. In an August 1999 survey, TIMES magazine 
found that “61% of respondents believed that federal law enforcement had started the fire” that 
killed the Branch Davidians (Benson 2018). In light of rising public distrust and increasing 
assertions of coverup, Attorney General Janet Reno appointed John Danforth, the former U.S. 
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senator for Missouri, to serve as Special Counsel and investigate both allegations of fire-starting 
and coverup by the Department of Justice and its component agencies. John Danforth and the 
Office of Special Counsel conducted a comprehensive review and issued the “Final report to the 
Deputy Attorney General concerning the 1993 confrontation at the Mt. Carmel Complex, Waco 
Texas,” also known as the “Danforth Report,” which “found [the] allegations totally meritless” 
(Danforth 2000, 41). The conclusiveness of the Danforth Report as well as the FBI’s “peaceful 
settlement of another confrontation” with an “armed citizens’ group” during the Montana 
Freemen standoff in June 1996, “partially restored the [FBI’s] reputation in its handling of crisis 
situations and helped amend the damaged relationship between federal law enforcement and the 



















Part III - The War on Terror and the FBI Today 
PENTTBOM and Detainees_______________________________________________________ 
One week after Robert Mueller was sworn in as the sixth director of the FBI, almost three 
thousand people were killed in the September 11 attacks. 9/11 demarcated a new era of 
American national security that would have major impacts on the FBI’s administration. 
Following 9/11, the FBI launched its Pentagon/Twin Towers Bombing Investigation, or 
PENTTBOM. At the height of the investigation, PENTTBOM involved 7,000 agents--over half 
of the FBI’s total agents-- as well as “half a million leads,” making PENTTBOM the bureau’s 
largest investigation to date (Goldberg 2007, 161).  
PENTTBOM involved the pre-convictional detainment of hundreds of suspects. The FBI 
jointly operated with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to forestall the 
mobilization of immigrant suspects through administrative detention. According to the 2005 
Senate hearing on terrorism detainees: 
“If the FBI encountered an alien in connection with pursuing any [PENTTBOM] leads, 
whether or not the alien was the subject of the lead, the FBI asked the INS to determine 
the alien’s immigration status. If the alien was found to be in the country illegally--either 
by overstaying his visa or entering the country illegally--the alien was detained by the 
INS. The FBI then was asked to make an assessment of whether the arrested alien was ‘of 
interest’ to its terrorism investigation. If the FBI indicated that the alien was ‘of interest,’ 
‘of high interest,’ or ‘of undetermined interest,’ the alien was placed on the INS Custody 
List and treated as a September 11 detainee” (U.S. Senate 2006, 209).  
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In the first eleven months after the 9/11 attacks, “762 aliens were detained on 
immigration charges in connection with the PENTTBOM investigation” and all detainees were 
included on the INS Custody List. The detainees were held until the FBI was able to clear them 
of connections to “September 11 or terrorism in general” (208). The average time that an 
uncharged detainee was kept in custody over the course of PENTTCOM was 80 days (U.S. 
Senate 2006, 211).  
The detentions of PENTTCOM inspired legal questions and challenges that were similar 
to those regarding military detainment at Guantanamo Bay. Furthermore, the FBI played a 
prominent role in both stateside INS confinements as well as Gitmo military detentions--FBI 
agents were frequently assigned to Guantanamo Bay to oversee interrogations and, later on, the 
voluntary testimony of these agents would prove instrumental in uncovering the questionable 
practices at the facility (OIG 2008). Extended detainment and classified registries of suspects 
echoed past intelligence controversies and the dubious interpretation of habeas corpus seemed 
reminiscent of past intelligence abuses, such as J. Edgar Hoover’s memorandum to President 
Truman requesting the suspension of habeas corpus so that the bureau could apprehend, detain, 
and register anti-American suspects post-WWII. In Rasul v. Bush (2004), the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled that habeas corpus applied “extraterritorially” to Guantanamo Bay and that detainees 
were permitted to file habeas petitions; however, it did not determine if “enemy alien detainees” 
were entitled to constitutional rights (U.S. Senate 2005, 329). The treatment of detained terrorist 
suspects was considered by Congress in 2005 during the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee’s 
Hearing on Detainees, which affirmed that the Al Qaeda was “not a party to the Geneva 
Convention” and therefore “individuals detained as members of Al Qaeda are not entitled to the 
protection of the treaties” (U.S. Senate 2005, 334).  
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The PATRIOT Act ______________________________________________________________ 
Following the 9/11 attacks, on October 26, 2001, the Uniting and Strengthening America 
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism, or USA 
PATRIOT, Act of 2001 was signed into law by President George W. Bush. The law received 
overwhelming legislative support and was passed with a vote of 357-66 in the House of 
Representatives and with near unanimity in the Senate with a final vote of 98-1 (DOJ 2001).  
Among the most controversial provisions of the PATRIOT Act were those related to 
national security letters. National security letters are administrative subpoenas that mandate their 
recipients to produce private information to federal investigators. The national security letter 
stipulations of the PATRIOT Act “included gag orders that forbade recipients from discussing 
the letter's contents and instructions and “the letters did not require a judge's authorization, and 
were subject to only limited judicial review” (LII, 2019). Section 501 of the PATRIOT Act 
permitted the FBI Director or designee of the director the authority to apply for “an order 
requiring the production of any tangible things [including books, records, papers, documents, and 
other items] for an investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine 
intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of a United States person is not conducted 
solely upon the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution” (U.S. 
Congress 2001, 17). Furthermore, Sec. 505 of the PATRIOT Act allowed any FBI personnel “not 
lower than Deputy Assistant Director” to access telephone, toll, and transactional records; 
financial records; and consumer reports when “the information sought is relevant to an 
authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence 
activities” (U.S. Congress 2001, 95).  
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Due to the intrusiveness and questionable constitutionality of the PATRIOT Act, the law 
was subject to statutory deadlines, or sunset clauses, in which many of the powers afforded by 
the law would expire without congressional reauthorization. In 2005, during the first sunset-
clause expiration, Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act. 
The reauthorization repealed the sunset deadlines for much of the PATRIOT Act, making most 
of the surveillance provisions permanent with the exception of mandatory reauthorizations every 
four years for the roving surveillance authority and national security letters provisions (U.S. 
Congress 2005).  
The sunset deadline was delayed by two years via two short-term extensions: the USA 
PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006--which amended the 
nondisclosure orders attached to national security letters--and a one year extension signed by 
President Barack Obama in 2010 (U.S. Congress 2006; Farrell 2010). President Obama signed 
the PATRIOT Sunset Extensions Act of 2011, granting a four-year extension to three parts of the 
PATRIOT Act, including: the “roving wiretap” provision that enables “federal authorities to 
listen in on conversations of foreign suspects even when they change phones or locations”; the 
“library provision” which allows the “government access to the personal records of terrorism 
suspects”; and the “lone wolf” provision that permits the investigation of “foreigners who have 
no known affiliation with terrorist groups” (Mascaro 2011).  
PATRIOT Act provisions were renewed upon their expiration in June of 2015 by the 
Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline Over 
Monitoring Act of 2015, also known as the USA Freedom Act. However, in addition to 
reauthorizing the aforementioned provisions, the USA Freedom Act did enact limits on 
PATRIOT Act intelligence authorities. This was largely in response to the NSA surveillance 
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practices exposed by Edward Snowden. The bill was introduced “to rein in the dragnet collection 
of data by the National Security Agency and other government agencies, increase transparency 
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, provide businesses the ability to release 
information regarding FISA requests and create an independent constitutional advocate to argue 
cases before the FISC” (Byers 2013). The USA Freedom Act imposed restrictions on the use of 
national security letters by the FBI, namely the “bulk collection” of data via administrative 
subpoenas, by requiring the FBI to identify a “person, entity, telephone number, or account as 
the basis for a [national security letter] request” and permitted the “judicial review” of national 
security letter nondisclosure orders by district courts (U.S. Congress 2015, 16 and 22). The 
reauthorizations of the PATRIOT Act by the USA Freedom Act are currently set to expire by 
December 15, 2019 (U.S. Congress 2015, 34).  
 
The 9/11 Commission and the Intelligence Community_________________________________ 
Naturally, the possible prevention of the 9/11 attacks was contemplated by most 
Americans. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States--more 
commonly known as the 9/11 Commission--was created by congressional legislation and the 
signature of President George W. Bush in late 2002 with the purpose of evaluating the events 
preceding 9/11 and issuing recommendations for superior counterterrorism policy.  
The final report of the 9/11 Commission was critical of the management and intelligence 
sharing of the FBI and CIA leading up to the events of September 11, 2001. The report 
reprimanded the component agencies of the U.S. Intelligence Community for operating as 
closed-systems of intelligence and included a list of ten “operational opportunities” the FBI and 
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CIA had to act on intelligence that may have averted the 9/11 terror attacks. Four of these ten 
opportunities involved the failure of the CIA to notify the FBI of counterterrorism leads 
associated with Al Qaeda membership (9/11 Commission 2004, 355-356). Based on its findings, 
the 9/11 Commission recommended that the “government must find a way of pooling 
intelligence and using it to guide the planning of and assignment of responsibilities for joint 
operations involving organizations as disparate as the CIA [and] FBI” (9/11 Commission 2004, 
357).   
The 9/11 Commission recommended the formation of a “National Intelligence Director” 
to “oversee counterterrorism intelligence work” and who could “set and enforce standards for the 
collection, processing, and reporting of information” (9/11 Commission 2004, 423). In 
accordance with this recommendation, the U.S. Congress established the Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence (ODNI) to manage all components of the U.S. Intelligence Community 
and facilitate information sharing between the agencies (U.S. Senate 2002). Additionally, on 
December 17, 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. 
Title VII of this law, the “Implementation of 9/11 Recommendations,” which, in addition to 
enacting the commission’s suggested changes to broader foreign policy, mandated that the FBI 
director submit an annual report on “whether the major information technology investments of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation are incompliant with the enterprise architecture of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation and identify any inability or expectation of inability to meet the 
terms set forth in the enterprise architecture” (U.S. Congress 2004, 232). This was in response to 
the 9/11 Commission’s conclusion that the FBI was hindered by inadequate information 
technology as well as “tightly restricted appropriations for improvements in information 
technology” (9/11 Commission 2004, 106).  
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Discussion: Hypothesis and Theory_________________________________________________ 
It is indisputable that the War on Terror has unified the American intelligence 
community, even beyond simply the codification of the ODNI. By examining the history of the 
FBI, we can see that this cooperation has both benefits, such as the success of joint-terrorism task 
forces, and consequences, such as the abuses of COINTELPRO, HTLINGUAL, Project 
Shamrock, etc. Counterterrorism efforts by the FBI and other intelligence agencies have been 
widely successful since the September 11, 2001 terror attacks. PENTTBOM, despite being the 
largest global investigation in FBI, successfully identified all nineteen 9/11 hijackers in “a matter 
of days” (FBI 2003). When President Obama signed a one-year extension to the PATRIOT Act 
provisions in 2010, “28 terrorist attacks” had been foiled by U.S. intelligence agencies using 
powers vested by the PATRIOT Act (Farrell 2010). By 2013, during the hearings on NSA 
surveillance powers, senior government officials testified that over fifty terrorist plots had been 
disrupted by the “U.S. government’s sweeping surveillance programs” (Nakashima 2013).  
Consideration of external forces is imperative to understanding support for the FBI’s 
intelligence policy. In 2003, just two years after 9/11 and the passage of the PATRIOT Act, a 
Gallup poll found that only 21% of Americans believed that the Bush Administration had gone 
too far “in restricting people's civil liberties in order to fight terrorism” (Moore 2003). It has 
since become evident that public attitudes toward counterterrorism policy are changing. In 2015, 
twelve years after the Gallup poll, bipartisan polling commissioned by the American Civil 
Liberties Union found that 60% of Americans believed that the Patriot Act should be reformed 
"to limit government surveillance and protect Americans' privacy” (Walker 2015). The FBI’s 
history supports the hypothesis that the bureau is entrusted with greater administrative discretion 
when the United States’ external environment becomes more uncertain. External uncertainty is 
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positively correlated with expansions to FBI power, specifically administrative authority 
independent of legislative or judicial checks and balances. The First Red Scare led to the creation 
of the Bureau of Investigation. World War II led to the expansion of the FBI’s foreign and 
domestic surveillance, particularly via wiretapping. The Second Red Scare and the Cold War led 
to the temporary registry of suspected radicals and COINTELPRO. The War on Terror led to 
centralized intelligence and the PATRIOT Act. With crisis, whether it be anarchist bombing 
campaigns, the rise of fascist regimes, communist infiltration of government, or Islamic 
terrorism, the public and the government are significantly united in support for hardline national 
security policy.  
However, in periods of stability in national security, there is less support for drastic 
intelligence measures. Peacetime, whether it be the early 1970s or today, privileges civilians to 
more critically assess security policies that infringe on civil rights. One reason that the backlash 
against COINTELPRO was so severe was the lack of urgency in the national context. The most 
pressing issues facing the government at the time of the exposure of COINTELPRO were 
primarily internal governmental conflicts. The communist threat had subsided and the nation was 
at a state of relative ease. This context made the Church Committee findings all the more 
offensive to the public. It is predictable that the electorate and, accordingly, the legislature would 
be more receptive to hardcore national security measures during times of distress and less 
receptive during peacetime. But to what extent does context affect the value debate over security 
and freedom? Would the Church Committee Hearings have proceeded as smoothly if they had 
occurred during the backdrop of 9/11?  
Following the September 11 attacks, some officials blamed the Church Committee for 
disempowering American intelligence and making the country dangerously susceptible to 
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terrorism. John Sununu, President George H.W. Bush’s chief of staff, asserted that the Church 
Committee “gutted our intelligence structure” by mandating the exposure of intelligence assets 
and thus preventing the “on-the-ground support that would corroborate and give the details to fill 
in the kind of abstract information that was available before September 11” (CNN 2002). 
Certainly joint-agency cooperation and intelligence sharing was more prevalent and effective 
during the time of operations like COINTELPRO, HTLINGUAL, and Project SHAMROCK. It 
could be potentially be argued that the effects of the Church Hearings sowed inter-agency 
distrust and dissuaded the intelligence sharing between the CIA and FBI that the 9/11 
Commission found may have thwarted the September 11 attacks. However, one would be hard-
pressed to reread the FBI’s blackmail letter to Martin Luther King Jr., urging him to commit 
suicide, and still challenge the absolute necessity of the Church Hearings.  
Despite certain consequences of ambiguous doctrines and amorphous administration, the 
flexible nature of the FBI’s administrative law is an asset to its operations. When considering the 
FBI’s most significant and controversial operations, it is apparent that most of the operations 
were enormously effective in their initial stages. COINTELPRO effectively dismantled the 
Communist Party of the USA while PENTTBOM led to the unprecedentedly fast identification 
of the perpetrators of 9/11. While libertarian-minded critics may challenge the constitutionality 
of drastic actions taken by intelligence agencies, it would be fallacious to deny that these actions 
often net results that potentially save lives. When national security is a variable, extreme 
measures are not undertaken by intelligence agencies out of convenience but rather perceived 
urgency.  
It is advisable that the authorizations of national security measures that have ambiguous 
constitutionality should be subject to sunset provisions. Mandatory deadlines for reauthorizations 
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during a reasonable span of time provide better direction to the mission of the FBI and similar 
agencies, preventing investigations from becoming too broad and all-encompassing like 
COINTELPRO. Having scheduled deadlines for the rereview of bureaucratic powers also 
promotes farsightedness in intelligence operations, compelling agency managers to foresee 
endgames in operations rather than relying on the indefiniteness of unchecked practices. Most 
importantly, these periodic evaluations allow for the review and possible suspension of extreme 
programs once such programs have run their course and netted all actionable intelligence 
necessary to protect and prosecute.  
It is also important to highlight the importance of intergovernmental oversight in 
intelligence operations. Interestingly, when reviewing the FBI’s administrative history, it seems 
that Congress is a more effective watchdog than the judiciary in regard to big-picture operational 
practices. While certain legislative conclusions, like the PATRIOT Act, remain highly 
controversial, it is apparent that the most egregious violations of civil rights and constitutional 
law were effectively curbed by House and Senate hearings and regulation. Of course, given the 
sealed and classified nature of administrative proceedings like those in the FISA court, it would 
be inaccurate to overlook the importance of judicial oversight over smaller-scale bureau affairs. 
Furthermore, it must be noted that legislative oversight is limited by the sensitivity of the 
information retrieved by the FBI. It is unrealistic and dangerous to expect total sharing of 
intelligence between executive agencies and Congress. The public disclosure of sensitive 
information by just one rogue legislator could potentially compromise ongoing investigations 
and, consequentially, national security.  
Bureaucratic politics, while often an inconvenience and obstacle to intelligence gathering, 
is both an inexorable reality of and vital necessity to FBI operations. The conflict and bargaining 
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process that determines the bureau’s authority is a chess game of checks and balances. This chess 
game becomes easier in the midst of national insecurity. Therefore, when considering the 
supported hypothesis and the bureaucratic politics model, we can theorize that, when faced with 
heightened external tensions, the FBI is less expected to participate in the bargaining process of 
bureaucratic politics in its role as an intelligence agency and acts more independently, 
powerfully, and expansively.  
Further research on the effect of external forces on bureaucratic politics should be 
considered to determine whether or not the FBI is unique in this theoretical operation when 
compared with other agencies. It seems probable that the theory applies to all agencies and 
departments associated with broader national security. If the theory proves applicable to other 
government agencies, we may see the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 
(ATF) expand similarly in response to the mass shooting epidemic, or the powers of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) grow as the climate crisis worsens.  
 
Conclusion: The Privilege of Peace_________________________________________________ 
The conclusion of this thesis--that the direction and independence of the FBI has largely 
been contingent on public fear--should not prove surprising to most readers. It is likely that most 
Americans, with or without research, understand that public and legislative support for 
intelligence powers rise during periods of instability. It hardly seems far-fetched that most people 
would easily forsake their utopic democratic values in the face of Armageddon. H.L. Mencken 
lamented this quality in his book Notes on Democracy, writing,  
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“I have spoken hitherto of the possibility that democracy may be a self-limiting disease, 
like measles. It is, perhaps, something more: it is self-devouring. One cannot observe it 
objectively without being impressed by its curious distrust of itself—its apparently 
ineradicable tendency to abandon its whole philosophy at the first sign of strain. I need 
not point to what happens invariably in democratic states when the national safety is 
menaced. All the great tribunes of democracy, on such occasions, convert themselves, by 
a process as simple as taking a deep breath, into despots of an almost fabulous ferocity” 
(Mencken 1926, 221-222).  
It is perfectly reasonable that, when an atrocity occurs, people become united to enact whatever 
available measures better ensure that such violence never happens again. It is easy for people to 
decry drastic reactions to events when they themselves are not victimized by such events. It is 
just as uncomplicated for an individual who has not been directly impacted by foreign terrorism 
to denounce policies like the PATRIOT Act as it is for an individual who has not been directly 
impacted by mass shooting to denounce gun control laws. The privilege of peace empowers the 
average American to cast judgment. This form of shallow virtue-signaling does not meaningfully 
contribute to national security discourse. The destruction wrought by national security threats 
rightfully changes perspectives on policy. It sheds moral indignation and fixations on virtuous 
appearances in favor of a pragmatic, complicated assessment of harsh reality.  
With other theoretical models of public administration, these assessments would be 
straightforward. The rational policy model assumes that the state operates unitarily and, 
therefore, will produce the most relatively unanimous and rational approaches to conflict. The 
organizational process model assumes that the laws, policies, and procedures of the state 
preaddress most conflicts and, therefore, policy may derive directly from preexisting rules. 
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Unfortunately, these models do not account for the reality of government administration. 
Bureaucratic politics theory understands the plurality of agendas within the state and correctly 
assesses policymaking as a process of conflict and bargaining by diverse actors. The existence 
and supremacy of bureaucratic politics is vital because, if the competing apparatuses of 
government are well-counterbalanced, the results of such bargaining are formed by compromise. 
The assessment of national security policy, including the administrative powers of the FBI, 
cannot be exclusionary and must involve the influence of all components of government. 
Bureaucratic politics protects against despotism because the compromises required by 
interconnected and conflictual policymaking between all branches of government moderates 
outcomes. Therefore, given the historical tendency of the FBI to participate less in bureaucratic 
politics bargaining during national insecurity, it is incredibly important to reinforce 
intergovernmental oversight and counterbalance during times of crisis. A perfect government is 
impossible. However, much of the infighting, red-tape, and iron triangles that people associate 
with governmental ineffectiveness are actually key bastions that defend and reconcile American 
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